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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the innovation activities of automotive component 
manufacturers in South Africa. It looks at the technological trajectory of a handful of 
firms that stand out from the crowd and analyses the results of their endeavours in the 
context of their interaction with foreign capital, their internal upgrading and R&D 
agenda, and their interface with South Africa’s national innovation system (NIS). The 
analysis makes use of eight case studies, and illustrates the conditions under which 
indigenous innovation in the automotive industries can happen in a developing 
country. This finding contradicts at least part of the conventional wisdom concerning 
the location of innovation activities in global car value chains. Results also point to a 
deficient NIS insofar as there appears to be a disjuncture between the demand for 
engineering competence in the manufacturing sector on the one hand and output from 
the tertiary education sector on the other. Open questions that need further attention 
include among others the overall functioning of the NIS, and changes over time in the 
perception of local innovation potential by car assemblers. 
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1 Introduction* 
 
Technological innovation is to development what a blue sky is to the Sunday picnic: 
essential to its success but in many parts of the world hard to count on. The conditions 
under which technological upgrading takes place are rather well understood in theory. 
In the context of developing countries, what matters is the availability of foreign 
capital and the presence of local capabilities to make good use of it. When foreign and 
local inputs match well, technology transfer and diffusion may take place and do the 
little trick of moving the developing country forward. 
 
 In practice, things are a lot messier. For a start, technological success stories are far 
and few between. Some firms, industries, and even entire countries have “made it” but 
their number is dwarfed by those who stagnate or seem to be moving backward, 
relatively or absolutely. In addition, technology transfer and diffusion are empirically 
hard to operationalise. Studies that overcome problems of intractability often 
conclude that multinational investments do not lead to spillovers in the host 
economies. Finally, in some industries the very structure of the value chain may 
militate against the technological upgrading of any firms that are not located in a core 
group of technology-leading countries. 
 
 This paper addresses the innovation activities of automotive component 
manufacturers in South Africa and, hence, in the context of a continent often 
associated with the absence of technological activity tout court. More specifically, it 
looks at the technological trajectory of a handful of firms that stand out from the 
crowd in the sense that they pursue activities aimed at technological upgrading and 
innovation. It analyses the results of their endeavours in the context of foreign capital 
(through the global supply chains to which they deliver), their internal agenda in 
terms of upgrading and R&D, and South Africa’s national innovation system. Section 
2 summarises the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces key performance indicators 
of the South African automotive industry post-liberalisation, both from a macro and a 
micro perspective. Section 4 discusses eight case studies and constitutes the principal 
analytical contribution of the paper. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2 Indigenous technological activity in developing countries: determinants and 
problems 
 
Most technological learning – namely the ability to make use of externally available 
knowledge – takes place in firms (Section 2.1). In addition, public investment in 
education and training feeds into technological accumulation. Especially scale-
intensive sectors such as the automotive industry necessitate technical and graduate 
engineering skills. This is part of the business environment – or the national 
innovation system – in which firms operate (Section 2.2). Finally, the specific 
structure of the value chains within which firms find themselves influences the 
                                                 
* The managers of a number of automotive component manufacturers who chose to remain anonymous 
generously made time available to answer our many questions. Without their insights we would not 
have been able to write our case studies. Mike Morris and Imraan Valodia helped us clarify some of 
our ideas. Workshop participants in Copenhagen, Oslo, and Durban provided constructive comments. 
We are grateful to all of them, and to Raj Narula for encouraging us to write this paper in the first 
place. Any errors or omissions are our own. 
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location of and the scope for innovation activity in global supply networks (Section 
2.3). Section 2.4 summarises what all this implies for the analysis at hand. 
 
2.1 Local firms: productive capacity, technological capability, and the impact 
of foreign knowledge 
 
Following the widespread liberalisation of trade and investment regimes in 
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, local firms are more exposed to 
competition from foreign firms and products. Hence indigenous technological activity 
interacts more than previously with imported knowledge, often in the form of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). This relationship is not straightforward. Inflows of superior 
foreign technology may enhance incentives for innovation because of the competitive 
climate they create. Alternatively, they may obviate the need for indigenous 
generation of technology through the creation of no-need-to-reinvent-the-wheel type 
situations. Firms who learn and upgrade – and this is not limited to new know-how in 
a narrow sense but includes operational techniques and managerial processes – are 
likely to be affected differently by foreign knowledge over time. Thus, for a new kid 
on the bloc, licensed technology may be the best bet to grow its competences. By 
contrast, once technologically more mature, the same firm may be in a position to take 
on more advanced knowledge embodied in FDI. Therefore, transfer modes influence 
the incentives for innovation. 
 
How all this plays out for the local firm and the host economy more generally 
depends, inter alia, on capabilities at both the micro and the national level. Relevant 
firm competences include the search for new knowledge, skill development, and 
internal knowledge diffusion. Investments in education, information provision, and 
infrastucture more generally are key among host country characteristics (Lall 1993, 
Pack and Saggi 1997; see also Narula and Dunning 2000 and Ozawa 1992 for stage 
arguments linking the relative development of the host economy to the kind and 
complexity of inward direct investment it attracts, or Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995 
for the relation between the entrepreneurial ambition and capability of subsidiaries, 
and intra-firm technology flows). 
 
 In principle, technological spillovers may materialise because local firms manage to 
copy technology from a foreign subsidiary. This is significant insofar as the 
technologies brought by MNEs will typically not be available in the market. Also, 
interacting with subsidiaries that use advanced technology may facilitate diffusion to 
local firms and reduce the risk from go-it-alone innovation. In practice, spillovers 
often prove elusive. Unfortunately, empirical research regularly fails to turn up strong 
evidence as to the exact nature and magnitude of spillovers (see Blomström and 
Kokko (1998) for a general survey, and Görg and Greenaway (2002) for an analysis 
of transition economies). This is but one of the reasons why research on the 
conditions of indigenous innovation in developing countries is so important, 
independently of whether they do or do not attract FDI. 
 
 Whether diffusion – understood as the acquisition of technology by local firms 
who then engineer adaptations and modifications to suit local needs – leads to 
innovation depends on the quality of resources the acquiring firms control. At a more 
basic level firms produce industrial goods using known combinations of equipment, 
skills, specifications, and organisational systems. Yet while necessary, production 
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capacity is not a sufficient condition for upgrading. To make the latter happen, firms 
must additionally possess the competences to incorporate new technology into their 
production capacity. These competences are also critical for continuous access to 
foreign technology in the context of moving closer to the global technology frontier 
which is of course itself a moving target. 
 
This underlines the importance of learning for technological capability. The more 
complex technologies are, the more trial and error play a role in their improvement. 
Therefore product design, process and product engineering are all important sources 
of technical change even in the absence of direct links with R&D. R&D labs, design 
offices, and production engineering must feed off of each other to facilitate learning 
by doing. In other words, innovation is rarely if ever a unidirectional step from R&D 
downwards to production (Bell and Pavitt 1993a; see also Bell 1997, Bell and Albu 
1999, Tidd, Bessant, and Pavitt 1997). This is not to detract from the key role of R&D 
for learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1989), but merely suggests that R&D spending 
alone is not a sufficient indicator for actual or potential innovation activity. 
 
2.2 National innovation systems: developing countries and South Africa 
 
The concept of national innovation systems (NIS) suggests that while firms are the 
main agents of technological learning, they interact more or less successfully with a 
host of other organisations and institutions. This interaction, in turn, influences where 
technical change comes from and how it is disseminated. The concept also proposes 
that countries are a meaningful unit of analysis insofar as distinctive national 
characteristics at least in part describe the differentiation of innovation activities 
across the world. High-income countries have been subject to very sophisticated and 
comprehensive analyses both of the evolution and the operation of their respective 
NIS (for example, Edquist 1997, Nelson 1993; see also Freeman 1994). A large body 
of work also exists that tries to explain differential rates of technological 
accumulation across developing countries (for an overview, see Bell and Pavitt 
(1993b) or Lall and Pietrobelli (2002) for a treatment of Sub-Saharan countries). On 
the whole, however, the links between the different constituents of the system, 
especially between firms and the tertiary education sector, are much less drawn out in 
developing country contexts. South Africa is no exception. 
 
From the beginning of apartheid in the late 1940s to the regime change in 1994, 
South Africa had no coherent NIS. What elements of a system existed were informed 
by the needs of a privileged minority with a distinct supremacist agenda. This 
obviously stood in the way of an integrated framework (Scerri 1998), but did not 
prevent the country from world-class performance in a number of technologies. 
Examples include coal-to-oil conversion, deep mining, clinical medicine and, 
prominently, IT and armaments. The latter in particular exemplified both the 
achievements of mission-driven research (for example, in the development of nuclear 
weapons as well biological and chemical warfare capabilities) and the ability to 
acquire, adopt, adapt, and extend foreign technologies. 
 
In the face of international sanctions, the sort of imitation encouraged by import 
substitution only partially gave way to competitive innovation in select areas such as 
aerospace engineering where advanced technologies proved much harder to get on the 
open market. What the sanctions regime definitely did was to keep effectively rather 
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indiscriminate import substitution alive beyond any sensible economic motivation. 
Except in the military sector, industry and universities did not collaborate much, but 
science was generously funded, replicating the dichotomy between pockets of 
excellence and severe deprivation that characterised the country at large (Kahn and 
Reddy 2001, see also Birdi, Dunne, and Saal 2000). For example, offerings in natural 
sciences and technology were traditionally discouraged in the ten black universities. 
Their remit consisted primarily of teaching; research programmes remained the 
exclusive domain of the eleven white-governed universities. It is not clear how long it 
will take to redress this imbalance which is clearly dysfunctional in an inclusive 
society. What is clear is that innovation in South Africa at present suffers from this 
heritage. 
 
Attempts to exploit best practices from national innovation systems elsewhere for a 
new science and technology policy led to the tabling of the first White Paper on 
Science and Technology in 1996. The ideas behind this initiative were an emphasis on 
cooperation between government, industry, and research institutions, along with a 
stronger focus on applications-based research. The White Paper spawned a number of 
policy initiatives. Of relevance to the present analysis are the Innovation Fund which 
promoted initiatives aimed at increasing competitiveness and at pushing collaboration 
between public Science, Engineering, and Technology Institutions (SETIs), the 
private sector, tertiary education, and civil society. This included the development of 
human resources generally and postgraduate training in particular through 
programmes such as Technology for Human Resources Programme (THRIP). To 
date, there has been little systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of these initiatives 
(but see Human Science Research Council 2003, Kaplan 2001). 
 
Critics charge that South African science and technology policy focuses too much 
on technology generation by the SETIs, and too little on technology diffusion (Kaplan 
1999, 486). The situation is compounded by unemployment levels of over 40 per cent, 
low skill levels, and insufficient labour mobility that exacerbate the social costs of 
technological change per se. Moreover, the country’s brain drain has affected the 
world-class aeronautical and IT industries (see Goldstein (2002) for a perceptive 
analysis of the difficulties of South Africa’s aerospace industry in adapting to reduced 
government demand and increased international competition). At 1.2 per cent of GDP, 
spending on higher education may be too low to reverse this trend (Kahn and Reddy 
2001). Even alleged high-tech hubs such as the Midrand area in the Gauteng are based 
on manufacture and functional services instead of R&D, except in defence-related 
firms. The retrenchment of the public sector as a major contractor and the absence of 
a deep venture capital market combine in a vicious dynamic that knocks firms off 
their feet without providing them with an opportunity to struggle back up again 
(Hodge 1998, Rogerson 1998). What remains is, as in the past, relatively isolated 
pockets of excellence (e.g. Versi 2001). 
 
2.3 Dynamics of innovation in the automotive industry 
 
Vehicle assemblers co-design new car models in cooperation with so-called 0.5 or 1st-
tier suppliers who deliver complete systems or modules, rather than individual 
components. Outsourcing and long-term cooperation – for components that require 
relationship-specific investments – have increasingly replaced the high degree of 
vertical integration and arm’s length contracts that traditionally characterised the 
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industry. The car manufacturers’ investment into the relationship with key suppliers 
culminates in the system sourcing concept pioneered among others by General Motors 
at its Gravatai plant in Brazil, where the entire plant lay-out was jointly developed 
with leading component manufacturers. However, the locus of R&D in the value 
chain has not really changed. Independent companies such as Delphi or Visteon, 
having been spun off by the car makers, have joined historically important component 
manufacturers such as Bosch or Allied Signals in delivering black-box parts to the 
specifications of the assemblers but based on their own design and technological 
solutions. 
 
In other words, vertical disintegration has not affected the scope for innovation 
activities below the 1st tier. What has changed, apart from a certain dissipation of the 
technological core away from the exclusive control of the assemblers, is the degree of 
concentration in the component industry which was forced to consolidate in order to 
acquire the global reach and financial depth necessary to survive in a very competitive 
industry suffering from chronic overcapacity. Hence, automotive R&D is essentially 
performed by fewer and very large, powerful firms protected by considerable entry 
barriers. It is unsurprising then that the world’s ten largest automotive component 
manufacturers each have annual sales in excess of US$8 billion. 
 
 In their attempts to reduce costs, car makers have begun to build a larger model 
variety onto fewer vehicle platforms. In addition, the idea of a “world car” aspires to 
compensate rising development costs and shorter model turnover cycles on the one 
hand with larger model runs on the other. This means that locally adapted versions of 
essentially the same model are available worldwide. It also means that, in conjunction 
with the widespread liberalisation of investment and trade regimes over the last two 
decades, select car plants in developing or transition economies deliver top-of-the-
range models to high-income countries. In practice, this has led to the harmonisation 
of quality standards across the world. For example, while in the past VW could get 
away with producing a substandard (old) Beetle in Mexico because it was mainly 
aimed at the domestic market, the new Beetle is primarily exported and must meet the 
same standards of quality and delivery as its model cousins manufactured in one of 
VW’s European plants. Therefore, except for the remnants of genuinely local vehicles 
manufactured mostly for local markets such as the Russian Lada or the Malaysian 
Proton, cars produced by the major vehicle assemblers anywhere in the world must 
meet the same exacting quality standards. 
 
 Organisationally, the system of relations between vehicle assemblers and 
component and part suppliers is among the most complex in any industry. Not only 
have assemblers devolved substantial responsibilities in product development to 
upper-tier suppliers, the latter are also expected to guarantee quality standards and 
delivery schedules of their own lower-tier suppliers whose parts and components feed 
into their modules and systems. Lean production methods (just-in-time inventory 
systems, decentralised total quality management, bottom-up suggestions for process 
improvements) affect the entire value chain; for example, even a 3rd-tier supplier must 
in principle be in a position to accommodate engineering changes to be implemented 
in ongoing manufacturing processes (MacDuffie and Helper 1997). 
 
Car makers have responded to the devolution of control over detailed design and 
production processes by tightening overall control of the production cycle. The two 
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key strategic tenets are “follow design” (several countries share the same vehicle 
design) and “follow sourcing” (the same manufacturer supplies parts in different 
locations). This guarantees the standardisation of vehicles and components within and 
across regions in the context of “world car” designs. Follow source decreases 
monitoring costs for the car makers while guaranteeing homologation. 
 
The structure and organisational configuration of the car industry and the strategic 
orientation of its key players militate against the involvement of upper-tier 
manufacturers from developing countries in design and of independent suppliers in 
global supply chains more generally. Currently it makes most sense for a vehicle 
manufacturer with an investment in a developing country to rely on the tested and 
trusted relationships with preferred suppliers that set up production close to wherever 
their customer goes. Consequently, a number of observers have concluded that 
developing country firms are likely to lose design and engineering capabilities, and 
that the auto industry will contribute little to the hoped for technological capability 
within manufacturing at large. Humphrey (2000) makes this argument for Brazil and 
India, Barnes and Kaplinsky (2000a, 2000b) for South Africa, and Rutherford (2000) 
comes to a similar conclusion with respect to Canada. At the same time there is 
emerging evidence that these downbeat assessments may overstate their case (for a 
contrasting analysis concerning Japanese automotive investments in the US, see Craig 
and de Gregory (2000), Humphrey and Memedovic (2003, 34-5) on product 
development capabilities in Mexico, Lung (2003, 18) on the new design pole in the 
Barcelona metropolitan area, or Lorentzen, Møllgaard, and Rojec (2003) on the 
experience in Eastern Europe). The present analysis is an attempt to shed light on this 
controversy. 
 
2.4 Summary: theoretical expectations on automotive innovation in South 
Africa 
 
The review of the literature makes clear that local automotive component 
manufacturers intent on engaging in innovation activities have the cards stacked 
against them. First, the presence of sophisticated local competences is no guarantee 
that technological spillovers will be forthcoming. Hence the role of foreign 
technology is ambiguous. Furthermore, there is a long way from improving 
production capacity to developing technological capability and, finally, to engaging in 
innovation true and proper. Second, although the mechanisms of the post-apartheid 
national innovation system are not well understood at present, it is uncontroversial 
that the system suffers from its apartheid-era legacy and also exhibits 
dysfunctionalities of more recent vintage. Third, innovation and design in global 
automotive production puts a premium on core localities and traditional suppliers with 
global remits. This tends to jeopardise these activities in liberalised emerging markets 
such as South Africa both directly and indirectly. 
 
 Yet as the case studies below show, some firms do in fact engage in innovation 
activities. Before analysing how they defy the odds, it is important to understand the 
development of the South African automotive industry pre- and post-liberalisation. 
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3 Macro and micro perspectives on innovation in South Africa’s automotive 
industry 
 
Although marginal by the standards of emerging markets with significant regional or 
global roles such as Mexico or Brazil, automotive production is an important industry 
in South Africa. It comprises eight producers of light vehicles, a number of specialist 
medium and heavy commercial vehicle makers, and some 250 dedicated component 
manufacturers, many of whom are subsidiaries of multinational firms. The industry 
employs over 100,000 people who are paid above-average wages. 2002 turnover was 
close to ZAR 100 bn. In 2001, total automotive production was worth 5.7 per cent of 
GDP and accounted for 12 per cent of exports. The industry’s relative share in 
manufacturing employment, sales, and production has increased over the 1990s and in 
2001 reached 6, 13, and 9 per cent, respectively. 
 
3.1 The industry before 1995 
 
Historically South African industry was heavily protected from outside competition. 
The car sector was no exception (see Black (2001) for a historical review). Nominal 
imports tariffs of up to 115 per cent ensured that domestic producers could profitably 
produce a broad portfolio of essentially outdated vehicles of questionable quality 
almost exclusively for the local market of, in the early 1990s, some 300,000-350,000 
units annual sales. In contrast to the East Asian experience, where temporary infant 
industry protection against import competition was granted in parallel with enforcing 
tough competition among domestic producers, vehicle assemblers and component 
manufacturers in South Africa enjoyed the privilege of passing on the inefficiencies 
nurtured in an ossified import substitution model to the consumers. This obviously 
affected the scope for learning in automotive firms. For example, until 1989 the basic 
reference parameter of almost three decades of local content programmes had been 
weight rather than value. Thus firms received a premium for designing and producing 
heavy rather than light – or lean – products. 
 
3.2 The industry from 1995 
 
In line with its broader macroeconomic liberalisation strategy, the new government 
launched the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) in 1995, originally 
expected to run until 2002. The MIDP aimed at increasing the international 
competitiveness of firms in the industry (for a detailed description, see Barnes and 
Black (2003), and Black (2001)). It consisted of a package combining a series of 
incentives with substantial import liberalisation – for example immediately cutting the 
import tariff on completely built up vehicles (CBUs) from 115 per cent to 65 per cent. 
Two reviews, in 1999 and in 2002, extended the programme to 2007 and 2012, 
respectively. Import tariffs are scheduled to reach 25 per cent for CBUs and 20 per 
cent for completely knocked down components (CKD) by 2012. 
 
 Next to gradual tariff reductions and the abolition of local content provisions, the 
most important feature of the MIDP is the Import-Export Complementation Scheme 
(IEC). Under this scheme vehicle assemblers and component suppliers can earn 
Import Rebate Credit Certificates (IRCCs) from exporting. Based on the value of 
local raw materials and value added in the exported product, these duty credits are 
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tradable and can be used to offset import duties on vehicles or components. In turn, 
this allows vehicle manufacturers to buy credits from component exporters to finance 
the import of completely assembled vehicles not produced locally, or of components 
they prefer to source abroad. In addition, car manufacturers can also draw on a duty- 
free allowance on component imports of 27 per cent of the wholesale value of the 
vehicle. Taken together, on the one hand this creates incentives for foreign assemblers 
to invest in production in South Africa for both the local and the export markets. It 
also makes sense for them to work with suppliers based in South Africa – though 
these need not be domestically owned. On the other hand the MIDP allows the car 
makers to retain their global supply networks. 
 
 The flip side of this arrangement is that domestic firms no longer have the luxury of 
domestic go-it-alone strategies and must confront the challenge of export success. 
This means that they either manage to join global supply chains or resign to bidding 
the automotive industry farewell. 
 
 The MIDP appears to have been successful in providing a framework conducive to 
the development of the industry though concerns persist how the gradual phasing out 
of export incentives will affect the sustainability of export expansion. For example, in 
2002 total passenger vehicle production was 288,000 units, nearly 50 per cent more 
than the 193,000 vehicles produced in 1998. Almost a fifth of these were essentially 
outdated models, some of which with a slow phase-out period of up to three years. 
Over 40 per cent of total production was for export markets, up from 4 per cent in 
1995 and 9 per cent in 1998. By contrast, sales of light commercial vehicles (LCVs) 
were 17 per cent lower in 2002 than in 1995, with only 8 per cent going abroad. 
Further, yearly real turnover of the components industry grew 7 per cent in 1997-
2000. Exports prominently contributed to this, growing more than 20 per cent 
annually since 1995. This performance was based on increased levels of capital 
investment and manifested itself in higher profitability, especially from the late 1990s, 
for both assemblers and component manufacturers. 
 
 The automotive industry’s trade balance continued to be negative through 2002. 
This is due to the reduction in effective protection and the use of IRCCs which 
increased the share of fully imported CBUs to 24 per cent of the domestic market, 
from 5.5 per cent in 1995, and reduced local content in locally assembled vehicles 
from 58 per cent to 50 per cent in 1997-2001. In 2000, only 5 per cent of component 
imports by value actually faced a duty (Black and Mitchell 2002, 6). Hence, South 
African based operations are progressively being integrated into global sourcing 
networks both upstream and downstream. This implies that they are much more 
subject to international competition than only a few years ago. 
 
 A number of competitiveness indicators for the industry improved. Labour 
productivity in 2001 was roughly a third higher than in 1998, and above the 
manufacturing average. Firm level data confirm that operationally much has been 
happening since the late 1990s (see Table 1). The information below is taken from a 
benchmarking club database that comprises competitiveness and financial 
performance data from over 40 automotive component manufacturers located in South 
Africa. These firms belong to one of three regional benchmarking clubs in KwaZulu-
Natal, Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces. They represent roughly 25% of the 
national automotive components industry by value. Each member is benchmarked 
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against an international competitor based in either Western or Eastern Europe, 
Malaysia or Australia. Thus the database includes information from a set of 
international firms that broadly match the product profile of their South African 
counterparts. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 How this compares to competitors in other developing, transition, and developed 
countries is evident from Table 2. South African based firms generally lag behind 
their competitors. Only the top performers generally match their international peers. 
How they manage to do that is discussed in detail in Section 4. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Also, the architecture of globalised automotive value chains has militated at least in 
part against domestic firms. A number of large, independent component 
manufacturers have had to leave their 1st-tier position for the 2nd tier, for example the 
Metair companies, Murray and Roberts, and the various subsidiaries of Dorbyl 
Automotive Technologies, all with turnover in excess of US$150m. Others were 
forced to abandon the industry altogether. Table 3 shows a clear preference on the 
part of the South African based car makers to source their components from wholly 
owned subsidiaries of multinational component suppliers rather than from domestic 
companies with proprietary or licensed technologies. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Although local technology has thus come under pressure, a quarter of the firms in 
the Benchmarking Club database in 2002 invested only 17 per cent less, in relative 
terms, in R&D than the international firms (see Figure 1). Of course, the data do not 
show if this is residual expenditure left over from the previous era of localisation and 
local design for the local market, or if it indicates, on the part of these firms, a search 
for more high value adding and innovative roles in the new global environment. The 
empirical evidence from the Benchmarking Club database is inconclusive insofar as it 
shows no positive relationship between R&D expenditure on the one hand and the age 
profile of products or operational competitiveness on the other. The former is due in 
part to the significant presence of foreign-owned subsidiaries who do not invest in 
R&D at all but do produce the latest products. The latter is probably affected by the 
manner in which most firms fail to measure R&D aimed at process innovation. At this 
level of aggregation, then, it appears difficult to investigate upgrading and innovation. 
It seems clear, however, that in line with theoretical predictions independent product 
innovation is not a prerequisite for upgrading. To unpack the nexus between 
upgrading and innovation and gain a more robust understanding of how firm activities 
in either are linked to the dynamics of global value chains and the national innovation 
system, our attention now turns to the case studies. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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4 Case studies 
4.1 Data and methodology 
 
Managers of five firms contained in the database discussed in Section 3 plus of three 
firms from without the Benchmarking Club agreed to participate in a series of in-
depth interviews with both authors. The interviewees held positions of managing 
director (7), CEO (1), and technical director (1). They received the questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1) prior to the meeting, and subsequently a written protocol for review. Due 
to the in part highly confidential nature of the data, anonymity was agreed. The 
interview explored questions derived from the theoretical discussion in Section 2. 
Thus it conceptualised three levels of analysis, namely the firm, the supply chain, and 
the national innovation system. 
 
 The firms span the entire range of possible ownership constellations (see Table 4). 
Four are domestically owned (two privately and two by a large holding company), 
one is a domestic company owned by an international investor, and three are foreign-
owned subsidiaries of European MNCs. We also interviewed a joint venture that is 
not fully reported here to protect confidentiality but that does inform the findings. 
Principal customers include the aftermarket (3), assemblers (5), and 1st-tier suppliers 
(1) on both the local and the global market. In terms of size, the firms ranged from 
100 to 800 employees and $4 to $120 million turnover. Their export-to-sales ratio in 
2002 was 0-80 per cent. The product portfolio includes relatively simple parts such as 
u-bolts, components such as alarm devices as well as complete fuel, exhaust and air 
conditioning systems. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2 Findings 
 
The discussion of the case studies follows the structure of the literature review. The 
focus is first on how firms learn, upgrade, and innovate. We then discuss the 
innovation activities of the firms in conjunction with the national innovation system. 
Finally, we draw out the implications of the innovation activities for the firms’ 
strategic positioning in the global automotive supply chain. 
 
4.2.1 Learning 
 
Learning is present in all firms. It covers production techniques, where the source of 
new insights was either the respective foreign partners (D1, D2, F1, F2),  independent 
search activities (D1, D3, F3), or both; specifications of more complex finished 
products through re-engineering of existing designs (D4); design (D2, F2, F4), where 
in one instance a foreign customer involved a local firm in finding technical solutions 
to their specifications (D2) and where, in another, an OEM set up a joint laboratory 
with a local firm (F4); and strategy (D1, D2, F1, F4), where the competitive 
environment or changing regulatory requirements in important markets challenged the 
local firms to respond to new situations. In an example of strategic alertness, D2 tried 
to abide by EU Regulation 34 on gas permeability even though at present only very 
few vehicles with D2’s components are actually exported to OECD countries. 
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Five firms regularly send staff abroad to pick up best practices or receive on-site 
input from their foreign partners. The purpose of these missions can be both learning 
(D1, D2, F1) and upgrading (F2, F3). One (F3) supports further studies of select staff. 
Another (F2) absorbs the innovation activity of the parent company over the life cycle 
of the product to be able to re-engineer variants of the original equipment when it 
matures into the aftermarket. Finally, some firms purposefully monitor industry 
dynamics so as to build competences before market demand for new or modified 
products actually manifests itself. 
 
4.2.2 Upgrading 
 
All firms upgrade what they make (D1, D2, D3, D4, F1, F4) and how they make it 
(D1, D2, D3, D4, F2, F3), or both. F1 alluded to the quality revolution that 
accompanied the arrival of global sourcing. In the past, reject rates below 3 per cent 
were tolerated and rates around 0.5 per cent considered eminently acceptable. Until a 
few years ago “ppm” was an unknown concept yet for the new Toyota Corolla export 
project F1 managed to meet the required target of no more than 50 ppm. R&D and 
solid engineering capabilities are behind the improvement in product profiles. Most 
R&D spending is targeted at new product development. In another case (D4), 
technical change is managed mostly through technology transfer from two licensors in 
Germany and Japan, respectively. For F3, the major challenge consists of translating 
the parent’s innovations into its extended production system, ranging from material 
sourcing to the optimisation of its production layout. 
 
R&D affects process improvements, too, along with a more broadly based 
technological and organisational facility to integrate individual parts and components 
into more complex products. D2 moved up the value chain by offering complete fuel 
systems instead of just fuel tanks. This implies accepting warranty obligations for 
parts and components, such as pumps or valves, that are sourced from abroad and that 
are thus more difficult to control. There are knock-on effects upstream and 
downstream in that the dynamics of the value chain pull up the quality at each tier 
(D2, F2). At D2 for example, rotational moulding benefited on the input side from the 
R&D activities of the polymer and fluorination producers whose product, because of 
their link with D2, assumed safety critical features. Upgrading may thus be both 
supplier- and customer-driven, as well as domestically and internationally linked, 
much as it presupposes a positive disposition for learning in the first place. 
 
4.2.3 Innovation 
 
Only two firms (F1, F3) categorically exclude self-driven product innovation 
activities. In the first case, research in acoustics control and noise reduction is so 
expensive and thus geographically concentrated that scope for decentralised activity 
does not really exist (F1). In the second, the design of OEM exhaust systems requires 
proximity to the vehicle assemblers which is why the foreign parent has R&D centres 
in both Europe and the US. 
 
Two firms (D2 and D3) have come up with innovative processes where they 
employ radically new techniques, different input combinations, or specific tooling 
arrangements primarily to obtain cost advantages. In one case (D2) it is tougher 
regulatory requirements that drives the search for a new production technique. Also 
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on the process side, D4 and F3 substituted processes developed in-house for much 
more capital-intensive toolings that would have been uneconomic for the much 
smaller production runs typical for South Africa. In one case (F3), the result was 
qualitatively so impressive – in terms of guaranteeing lower reject rates – that the US 
sister operation preferred it to the equipment used by the German parent. In 
acknowledgement of the local process engineering capabilities, the parent dropped the 
process support fee previously charged and granted complete process autonomy. 
 
Three other firms (D1, F2, F4) have produced entirely new products for which they 
own the intellectual property. In one case (D1) this has taken the form of 
diversification sideways which aims at new markets, namely away from automotive 
products. In another (F2), downwards re-engineering (whereby fewer different 
components with wider applicability substitute a higher number of more specific 
components) aims at developing cost-effective components for the aftermarket, while 
diversification upwards tries to circumvent the strictures of follow design in marginal 
markets both locally and abroad. By contrast, F4 holds multiple international patents 
and in 1997 won the European Environmental Award for its innovations. It licenses 
its products to a major OEM assembler and a 1st-tier supplier. 
 
 F2 shows the limits to blue-sky developments compared to the past. The world car 
concept increasingly means that all capital-intensive R&D is centralised in Western 
Europe and North America, thus leaving little or no space for players that in terms of 
their innovation activities are marginal. By contrast, in the early 1990s the 
predecessor of the affiliate had 4-5 professional staff working on a leading materials 
technology it had developed. After the arrival of its new owner this was immediately 
discontinued in South Africa and for cost reasons moved to a more central location. 
Of course, the location for R&D need not remain in the home country of the MNC but 
to the extent that it does get relocated it is much more likely to move to another place 
in the Triad, as happened when the new parent set up a technology centre in the US in 
proximity to the Big-3. 
 
This trend appears to be growing stronger as design and manufacturing for car 
makers are separated. For example, a MNC competitor is developing a system that the 
group to which this firm belongs will eventually make, meaning that even among 1st-
tier suppliers core competences are more and more narrowly defined. In a global 
context, the local subsidiary does not occupy a position from which it could single-
handedly promote ambitious innovation activities nor offer itself to customers who 
would like to outsource certain development tasks. This sort of subsidiary mandate 
could emerge only if the affiliate were assigned centre-of-excellence status because of 
a fortuitous combination of low labour costs and sophisticated engineering skills. In 
sum, with expensive, highly centralised R&D, technical agreements are important for 
the local firm to keep up to date. But when R&D is centralised purely for 
organisational reasons, then TAs are instrumental only to guarantee follow-source 
contracts. Over time, the latter may be subject to change. 
 
 Ownership and market focus may have a bearing on how easily firms can exploit 
technological opportunities. Independent firms on the whole have obviously fewer 
resources than multinational groups. But they do not face the trade-off between access 
to resources and R&D concentration that characterises MNCs. For example, D2 
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engages in expensive innovation activities that it would not likely be allowed to 
undertake if it were a subsidiary in a larger group. 
 
 The example of F2 and F4 also shows that the aftermarket and the local OEM 
market are more permissive in terms of accepting solutions that deviate from the 
norm. But although F2 as a member of a group is kept on a much shorter leash than 
F4, they share a commitment to retaining technical competence, along with the ability 
to design and test solutions that in essence can be either minor adaptations of existing 
solutions or more radical departures from existing products or processes. Either way, 
this involves innovation, thus requiring staff (or at least to have access to service 
providers) who can design, test, create the necessary tooling , and so on. 
 
 These findings, albeit not representative, suggest some insights into the relationship 
between production capacity and technological capability on the one hand, and 
innovation activity on the other. The going wisdom in technology accumulation, 
namely the principles of a certain hierarchy of competences and linearity implied in 
the idea of a progression from process to product innovation, does shed light on select 
trajectories but is only part of the whole story. For example, prodded on by its parent, 
F2 has made significant improvements in stock control. Although inventory 
management is not a sufficient condition for innovation, it is necessary – firms that do 
not possess a world-class manufacturing competence are unlikely to get involved in 
successful innovation. This is because the knowledge accumulation associated with 
the former provides the ground for building technological capability. The gains for F2 
from the relationship with the parent company imply that, in the absence of the 
foreign direct investment, F2 would have been relegated to the niche aftermarket. 
 
But the problem with generalising this view is that it simply reverses the hierarchy 
of simpler and more complex competencies and the linearity of assimilation compared 
to innovation that emanates in top-down fashion from R&D proper. The cases show 
that exposure to the exacting requirements of lean production need have no bearing on 
the scope for R&D and design. For some components, R&D is geographically so 
concentrated that opportunities and incentives for technological learning are 
objectively limited so that lab activity bypasses all but the leading units or 
manufacturers and hence not just those in emerging markets. Industry or (sub-)sector 
characteristics therefore matter. Perhaps more importantly, sometimes technological 
capability informs production capacity rather than the other way round (e.g. D1, D2). 
And there is also learning-without-doing (D2). Hence the other part of the story is less 
intuitive. What seems clear is that when a firm’s knowledge system is superior to its 
production system, the real bottleneck to bringing innovative ideas on stream lies on 
the shopfloor and not in the absence of cutting edge activities per se, nor for that 
matter in the logic of the supply chain as such. 
 
4.2.4 Path dependency and the national innovation system 
 
Import-substituting industrialisation and, later, sanctions turned South African 
manufacturing into a jack-of-all-trades. The former meant that there was a premium 
on local content. The latter necessitated designing technical solutions even when they 
were available on the open market simply because South Africa under apartheid was 
not an accepted customer. The principal challenge for innovation was to realise low 
volumes at acceptable cost. Drawbacks of this system included, as elsewhere, 
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inefficiency and substandard quality except in areas deemed essential to the regime’s 
survival. 
 
 What happened subsequent to the liberalisation of the economy was that increased 
competition disciplined manufacturers to reduce their product portfolio. The new 
focus on core competence, in connection with cheap, high-skilled labour and the 
knack of engineers for “making do”, meant that niche opportunities in global 
automotive supply became within reach. For example, through rearranging toolings 
produced in-house and through decreasing capital-labour ratios, local firms were able 
profitably to organise production runs of 60,000 units for phase-out vehicle models 
that producers in high-cost countries could only make at volumes of at least 300,000 
units. At the extreme, F4 occasionally produces a dozen catalytic converters to order. 
Hence compared to the past, where in the absence of effective competition firms 
could get away with the inefficiencies that resulted from doing too many things 
themselves, including in-house tooling, tooling now deepens the firms’ focus and no 
longer contributes to horizontal efficiency losses. It helps local firms to compensate 
for perhaps less-than-optimal production runs by designing alternative solutions at 
low engineering costs. This is a positive example of path dependency 
 
A negative example is the uncertain future of human capital in engineering. It 
appears in short that competences embedded in South Africa’s old military industry 
have more successfully adapted to global market demands than the country’s new 
education system. In the past, engineering competence was created for and absorbed 
by the military sector from where it fertilised other manufacturing sectors. A 
substantial part of R&D personnel and also many production engineers in the case 
firms had a military background. Most were middle-aged or older. With the 
retrenchment of the military complex, it is important that the tertiary education system 
produce technical specialists and engineering graduates to fill the thinning ranks of 
gradually retiring military engineers. Yet all firms report serious difficulties with 
hiring and retaining qualified staff; high-order skills appear in short supply in the 
industry. 
 
Links with university career centres are underdeveloped. Only one firm (F3), 
underlined the value of its trainee programme in conjunction with the local technikon. 
At F2, recent graduates start earning their keep after about 4 years of in-house 
training. At D1, only one engineer is a recent university graduate and the company, 
despite being only 2 kilometres from a leading university, has had no contact with the 
engineering faculty in more than a decade. In addition, training has public good 
character and the problem is that qualified staff have ample incentives to leave the 
company in search for the highest bidder. This is particularly true for technically 
qualified black staff, due to strong affirmative action policies that prioritise the 
employment of black people. The disjuncture between tertiary education sector output 
and labour market demand, unless addressed with urgency, comprises the danger of 
lock-in into activities that are not aligned with the country’s traditional competence 
and that are below its potential. 
 
The business environment is deficient also with respect to institutions that support 
innovation activities. Almost all firms report difficulties with the national testing 
bureaus, the South African Bureu of Standards (SABS), the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) as well as university labs. For example, it was noted that 
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CSIR staff are sometimes unfamiliar with international testing parameters. D3 reports 
that turnover time for testing products at the local CSIR office is six weeks. The firm 
has consequently resorted to sending samples to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology which guarantees the same service within one week. D4 has to have its 
more complex chemical analyses done in Japan due to an absence of suitable local 
facilities, although it does rely on a local university for simpler testing. The problem 
appears to be not so much quality per se as a lack of specialisation required to deal 
with the very precise requirements of the automotive industry. F4’s foreign parent 
organises testing through universities in Europe. If it were not for the testing, F4 could 
in principle do away with the parent company’s support. This suggests a mismatch 
between the technological capabilities and the innovation potential of some South 
African firms and the national support infrastructure. 
 
4.2.5 Strategy 
 
Local automotive suppliers must reckon with the constraints the global automotive 
supply chain imposes on them. But contrary to what some observers have argued, 
they need not resign themselves to the downplaying of their technological capabilities 
through the principles of follow-source and follow-design. Indeed, the firms analysed 
here quite definitely challenge the marginalisation of local design and development 
activity. Figure 2 sketches the strategic options available to developing-country 
producers from the perspective of local automotive supply manufacturers (for the 
OEM perspective, see for example Sugiyama and Fujimoto 2000). 
 
The strategic positioning of automotive suppliers depends on the markets they are 
focused on; the customers they sell to; and the level of control they have over the 
product (see Figure 2). The control variable is the one most relevant to technological 
learning and innovation. High levels of control imply ownership of intellectual 
property. A firm affords medium levels of control if it has the capability to understand 
the technology developed by its technology partner or its competitors. Hence in 
principle it would be able to improve the product, diversify upwards, and claim 
ownership of a new design. Low levels of control denote firms with sufficient 
productive capacity but too low absorptive capacity to appreciate what is going on at 
the technology frontier. In terms of customers, firms may sell to the aftermarket or to 
assemblers and upper-tier suppliers, or both. Likewise, in terms of markets they may 
concentrate on the local market or also export to global markets, or serve only the 
latter. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The different combinations of control, customers, and markets affect the viability of 
strategic positioning. Firms that sell licensed or off-patent products only to the local 
aftermarket – denoted by the lower Southwestern corner of Figure 2 – are more 
subject to the vagaries of demand than those that sell both locally and internationally, 
supply both OEMs and the aftermarket, and own or at least understand the technology 
embedded in their product. Clearly, firms that supply key components to OEMs that 
are difficult to source elsewhere because they have a combined cost/technology 
advantage, are less vulnerable to supplier substitution. By the same token, a global 
supply mandate based exclusively on cost advantages is dangerous in that it may last 
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no longer than the next model change. The more fortuitous positionings thus lie in the 
upper reaches of the central and northern areas of Figure 2. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 illustrates the stylised trajectories from Figure 2 in more detail. D1, D2, and 
F3 follow global niche strategies, and D4 may attempt to do so in the future. They 
target output levels that extend beyond the confines of local demand while settling for 
production runs that are too small to interest their global competitors. This reconciles 
their own capacity with market opportunity and affords them a relatively high degree 
of control. It also opens up the prospect of cooperative agreements with leading 
systems suppliers such as that envisaged between D1 and Visteon where the latter 
may see this as an opportunity to complement its product portfolio for volumes in 
which its own minimum efficient scale is too high. Global niche strategies may also 
grow out of local-only supply contracts, and this has implications for innovation 
activities. The LCV sector, which is more developed in South Africa than in many 
higher income economies, has traditionally more scope for indigenous R&D because 
it was mainly aimed at the local market and manufactured in smaller volumes. But 
when Ford soon starts exporting 18,000 units of the 4-litre Rancher truck to Australia, 
D2 is in a strong position to supply the export programme on top of production for the 
local market. 
 
D3 competes for follow design contracts to maintain its reputation with existing 
customers. At the same time it invests in its technological capability to retain the 
option of permit diversification – in terms of further developing the technology 
codified in existing licenses – so that it can claim more value added once it has 
become an acknowledged and trusted supply partner. The hoped for upshot is again 
more control. D4 and F3 are a similar case. 
 
F1, F2, and F3 jockey for world mandates. F1 uses a combination of technical 
know-how gained from its joint venture partners, privileged access to raw materials, 
and its own competence in the manufacture of cost-effective toolings to try to emerge 
gradually from the shadow of the OEMs’ preferred suppliers in their home countries. 
This would raise the attractiveness of the assets they command and, hence, afford 
them more control. The biggest organisational challenge consists of defending the 
firm’s interest in a web of technical agreements of different nature with MNCs that 
compete against each other. By implication, F1 increasingly both cooperates with and 
competes against the very same partners in different contracts. 
 
F2’s main challenge has been how to graduate from a capable but also vulnerable 
supplier concentrated on the local market to a dynamic MNC subsidiary with multiple 
constituencies and promising product mandates. Thus it competes for group-wide 
contracts against other subsidiaries, much like F3. Parent strategy obviously matters, 
but so does the entrepreneurial instinct of the local managers. The main issue here is 
to secure the survival of the affiliate in the context of changing market demands and 
new supply opportunities through new affiliates in other emerging markets such as 
China that clearly are competitive threats. So the firm must have a spread of local 
vehicle assembler customers, a local aftermarket presence, plus significant export 
business. 
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F4 possesses a world mandate for the aftermarket. It licenses its technology to 
OEMs rather than selling to them directly. Retaining its technological edge is a key 
tenet of the company’s strategy. 
 
In sum, firms that pursue global niches, world mandates, or both possess world-
class technological capability without which car makers would not even talk to them. 
And they possess or secure access to the resources that support global activities. This 
often involves a foreign partner, but need not. Technological capability is important 
also for firms who supply the aftermarket. As car makers raise and expand product 
specifications, they help create an advanced aftermarket that the supplier, through its 
own ongoing design and development activities, can exploit. D1 reported such 
dynamics from the market for retrofitting cars with ever more complex and intelligent 
security devices. 
 
4.2.6 Summary 
 
Firms learn both through their own search activities and from others, notably foreign 
technology partners (for a more cautious view, see Valodia 1999). The object of their 
learning encompasses manufacturing processes, product specifications, as well as 
what goes on in their sector more broadly. The fruits of this learning manifest 
themselves in the upgrading of how they operate, what they make, and how they 
position themselves in the value chain to which they belong. Upgrading relies on 
individual and collective technological capabilities, namely those that the individual 
firm possesses as well as those present upstream and downstream with beneficial 
effects across tiers. The innovation activities of firms cover processes and products. 
Product innovation is strictly excluded only if R&D is so capital-intensive as to be 
prohibitively costly. Where it does happen, it takes the form of downwards (into the 
aftermarket) or upwards reengineering, sideways diversification, and even blue-sky 
development (F4). Whether innovation trickles downward from R&D or grows 
upward from gradual assimilation of technologies and process improvements, differs 
from firm to firm and depends, more precisely, on the relative strengths of each firm 
in terms of productive capacity and technological capability. Innovation in 
aftermarket products is generally easier and helps retain technological competences. 
 
 Subsidiaries of multinational firms typically have easier access to superior 
technology compared to their domestic rivals. Yet the latter may marshal superior 
technological competence insofar as they can decide to invest in R&D while the 
subsidiary will often be sidelined by centralised innovation activities. This means that 
what militates against indigenous innovation in the automotive industry is not so 
much the strategic principles of follow design or follow source per se, but the 
presence, alongside foreign capital, of local technological competence. This should 
not be misconstrued as an argument against FDI but it suggests that FDI attraction 
alone will not do the trick of promoting technological innovation. By extension, the 
national innovation system, especially the subsystem of education and training, merits 
more attention because it is here that learning and upgrading – which is clearly 
promoted by foreign capital – can be translated into innovation.  
  
Innovation activities are path-dependent insofar as current competitive strengths 
draw on engineering competences originally bred in the military sector that manifest 
themselves both in innovative product design and in process engineering capabilities, 
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especially concerning technical solutions for niche demands, in highly flexible tooling 
environments (for parallels in the history of Toyota, see Fujimoto 1998). The gradual 
implosion of the military sector is thus a problem, as is the perhaps inappropriately 
focused or weak higher education system. This limits the potential to produce the 
human capital to fill the present gap and, more seriously, ensures future shortcomings. 
Firms also suffer from a deficient innovation infrastructure as fas as advanced testing 
institutions are concerned. 
 
 Local firms, including foreign subsidiaries, insure themselves against uncertainty 
by diversifying their portfolio in terms of customers and markets and by trying to 
enhance control over how and what they produce. Harnessing their technological 
capability is a key means to this end. The latter point again underlines the significance 
of innovation as the means to gain ownership of intellectual assets. Firms follow four 
strategies. First, the global niche strategy attempts to leverage control over 
technological assets for more secure positions in the supply chain. Second, the 
(process or product) permit diversification strategy bets on gradual emancipation from 
follow source or follow design through offering either better or more efficient 
solutions to 1st-tier suppliers or assemblers. This may, but need not be limited to the 
local market. Third, the world mandate strategy exploits the cost advantages inherent 
in cheap, high-skilled human capital. Fourth, the blue-sky strategy defends its 
technological edge in the longer term through the judicious creation of strategic 
partnerships allowing for world mandate remits. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This analysis has illustrated the conditions under which indigenous innovation in the 
automotive industry can happen in a developing country. It has also explored what 
drives activities aimed at exploring innovation potential and what stands in the way of 
dynamic local firms in terms of bringing their endeavours to a successful completion, 
independent of whether they are of domestic, foreign, or mixed ownership. In one 
sentence, innovation builds on cumulative past capabilities mediated through learning 
and upgrading, with the aim for firms to position themselves strategically in global 
automotive supply chains. The case studies consciously singled out firms that stand 
out from the crowd in terms of their technological dynamism (see Hobday (1995) for 
a similar approach). This obviously biases the findings which must not be read as a 
characterisation of South Africa’s automotive sector at large or, for that matter, of the 
general relationship between productive capacities and technological capabilities on 
the one hand, and innovation on the other. 
 
The results do not constitute a wholesale rebuttal of the pessimism that is evident in 
previous assessments of the potential contribution the automotive sector might make 
to technological development both in South Africa itself and in other developing 
countries. But it refutes two very deterministic arguments of that literature. First, it is 
simply not true that indigenous innovation does not happen. Second, there is no 
evidence that, over time, the structure of innovation in the automotive industry 
necessarily marginalises local innovation potential to the point of extinction. 
 
The paper admittedly leaves many questions unanswered. While it establishes the 
importance of firm capabilities in their dynamic interaction with the automotive 
supply chain and the national innovation system, it says nothing about the relative 
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significance of these three levels of analysis. This is problematic especially insofar as 
the operation of the national innovation system and its bearings on individual 
manufacturing industries in South Africa have never been systematically researched. 
For those interested in S&T policy, one of the most interesting questions is at what 
point the marginal benefits for the development of technological capability from 
learning-by-doing in ongoing manufacturing processes become so low as to require 
discretionary investment into new skills and knowledge, and if there is a danger of 
market failure. The present analysis hints that (some) domestic entrepreneurs will try 
to wrest control over technology embodied in foreign capital from the original 
owners. So the real worry may be hollowing-out from within. That is, managers and 
engineers may be able to move their operations up the supply chain. But they 
obviously cannot organise the education system on which they rely for their exploits. 
There is much to be gained from addressing South Africa’s knowledge infrastructure 
– both its past anatomy and the changes it has been subject to – in a comprehensive 
study. 
 
Another question that needs systematic analysis is the relationship between 
ownership and innovation. The cases show that while domestically-owned firms at 
times seem to enjoy greater leeway than their foreign-owned counterparts in 
committing resources to R&D, the most innovative firm in the sample, although 
formerly South African, is now in foreign ownership. This throws up many questions, 
not least about the stickiness of competences based on tacit and thus location-bound 
knowledge. 
 
Also, the firms analysed here, while offering rich insights, represent just 3 per cent 
of all automotive firms in South Africa. The data base described in Section 3 suggests 
that up to a quarter of all firms have upward technological trajectories based on their 
internal innovation-related activities. It would clearly be desirable to include more of 
these firms in the analysis. Finally, the analysis does not directly engage with the car 
assemblers even though they are key for the strategic perspective of indigenous 
innovation. For example, given what we currently know it would appear difficult 
empirically to judge the dynamic trade-off between low monitoring costs thanks to 
follow source on the one hand and cost advantages from gradually incorporating more 
efficient and capable local firms into more advanced mandates of their supply chains. 
In sum, watch this space. 
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Table 1. – Average competitiveness improvements recorded at Benchmarking Club members 
 
Indicator Unit 1999 2002 Improvement (%)
     
Total inventory holding Days 51.14 40.19 21.41 
Customer return rate Ppm 4,269 1,034 75.78 
On time & in full delivery % 91.73 92.17 0.48 
Absenteeism % 4.20 3.59 14.52 
     
 
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
 
 
Table 2. – Relative performance of Benchmarking Club members 
 
Indicator Club 
member 
average 
Club member 
upper
quartile 
Developing/ 
transition 
economy average 
Developed 
economy 
average 
     
Total inventory holding 40.19 23.00 32.81 37.30 
Customer return rate 1,034 23 529.71 785.22 
On time & in full 
delivery 
92.17 98.00 96.38 91.91 
Absenteeism 3.59 2.00 4.35 5.67 
     
 
Source: KZN/Eastern Cape/Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
 
 
Table 3. – Ownership status of SA based OEM suppliers (n=4), % 
 
Category 1997 2001 2003 
    
Wholly owned subsidiaries of MNC auto component 
manufacturers 
26.0 31.7 37.5 
Joint ventures between SA companies and MNC auto 
component manufacturers 
18.5 26.0 32.5 
SA companies with technology agreements with MNC 
auto component manufacturers 
29.8 24.3 20.0 
SA companies with SA technologies 25.8 18.0 10.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
 
Note: Figure for 2003 is projection. 
Source: Interviews with purchasing directors of OEMs 
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Figure 1. -- R&D expenditure as a percentage of turnover: 1999 to 2002 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
Year
Per cent 
Inter. avg. (n=15) 2.40 
Club avg. (n=23) 1.63 1.53 1.88 1.46 
Club upper quartile 2.36 2.40 2.05 2.00 
Club lower quartile 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.50 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
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Table 4. – Learning, upgrading, and innovation in eight case studies 
 
Firm      Ownership Product/Market Learning Upgrading Innovation
         What? From whom? What? How? What? How? Why?
 
D1   Domestic Vehicle
electronics/mainly 
aftermarket 
Strategic 
insights 
Industry 
dynamics, 
competition 
(own search) 
Products 5% turnover on R&D; 
80% of R&D toward 
new product 
development 
 
Product Diversification sideways ?  
expansion to non-automotive 
products (GPS, GSM) 
 
Target new markets (e.g. 
India) and new sectors to 
occupy new niches 
Staff training in 
TQM in Japan 
Advanced
production 
techniques  
By doing 
Production facilities, 
processes 
Pull exerted by in-house 
product development 
Product Adaptation ? 1st- and 2nd-tier 
supplier to Ford and VW for 
local models 
Tap into remnant of vehicle 
designs available on local 
market only 
 
D2 Domestic Fuel tanks and fuel 
systems/OEM 
supplier mainly for 
local market 
Regulations in 
high-income 
markets  
Own search 
activity 
Products 1.2% turnover on R&D; 
85% of R&D on new 
product development 
Process Diversification upwards ? 
rotational moulding for fuel 
tanks 
Cost advantages for 
production runs up to 
45,000 units 
 Best practices
in rotational 
moulding 
Staff visits to 
rotational 
manufacturers 
overseas 
 
Raw material inputs Suppliers invested in 
R&D themselves 
Process Diversification upwards ? 
new process to guarantee tank 
impermeability 
 
Prospective Californian 
zero-emission standards 
Fuel tanks to fuel 
systems 
Assume control over 
system and accept 
system liability 
Design (e.g.
utility boxes) 
OEM customer 
(e.g. Daimler-
Chrysler) 
 
Production capacity 
 
Technological 
capability 
 
D3   Domestic Gearlocks, u-bolts,
spare wheel 
carriers/OEM 
supplier mainly for 
local market 
Production 
technology: 
reconcile 
efficiency with 
low volumes 
Path 
dependence 
Procedures ISO 9001 in 1994; QS 
9000 in late 1990s; 
tripling of engineering 
staff 1996-2003 
Process  Input substitution Cost advantages 
     Products 85% of R&D on new 
product development; 
improve on existing 
licenses 
Process Self-sufficiency in tooling, 
dyes etc. 
 
Cost advantages 
       Product Own design for locally sold 
vehicles 
 
Keep R&D and design 
capability 
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Firm      Ownership Product/Market Learning Upgrading Innovation
         What? From whom? What? How? What? How? Why?
 
D4     Domestic Lighting
systems/OEM 
supplier mainly for 
local market; 
aftermarket 
Spec’s of 
finished 
products 
(know-how but 
not know-why) 
Re-engineering 
of complex 
designs 
Process Foreign staff and 
outside (but local) 
expertise in injection 
moulding 
Process Re-engineer expensive
machine tools 
 
Increase cost effectiveness; 
exploit flexibility; secure 
local production  
     Products 2-3% turnover on R&D; 
TA partners assist with 
technical change 
Product Adaptation ? supply to 
OEMs for local models; 
specialty products for niche 
applications 
Exploit remnants of local-
only vehicle design 
 
F1 Foreign Trim, foam, foam 
mouldings/OEM 
supplier 
New production 
technology 
Staff visits 
abroad to pick 
up best 
practices; JV 
partner/licensor 
set up 
production line 
from scratch, 
fix problems 
 
Technological 
capability 
License agreements (b/c 
firm must understand 
latest technology); 90% 
of R&D on new product 
development 
Strategic
direction 
Web of 
technical 
agreements 
with competing 
MNCs 
 
Core competence 
(problem: increased 
competitiveness 
upsets TA partners) 
 
Reduction of product 
portfolio because of 
increased competition 
Production
technology 
TA partners      
   
F2     foreign Heat transfer
components, HVAC 
systems/OEM 
supplier 
Innovation 
activity of 
parent before 
end of product 
cycle 
 
Parent Production
technology 
Staff training in-house 
and abroad 
Product Re-engineering downwards 
? e.g. combine different 
specifications in fewer 
products 
Exploit aftermarket at 
beginning of replacement 
cycle 
Stock control Parent Manufacturing
competence 
Investment in 
operational performance 
Product Re-engineering upwards ? 
dedicated A/C unit for Isuzu 
truck; follow design not so 
strict for LCVs 
 
Enhance control over 
product and vis-à-vis 
customers. 
Raw materials Quality requirements of
supply chain 
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Firm      Ownership Product/Market Learning Upgrading Innovation
         What? From whom? What? How? What? How? Why?
 
F3   Foreign Catalytic converters,
exhaust systems and 
components/OEM 
supplier 
Dedicated 
solutions to 
specific 
company 
problems 
Student interns 
from nearbyt 
echnikon 
Process (human 
capital) 
Regular staff training, 
support for work-cum-
study programmes, staff 
assignments abroad, 
support of local highere 
education institutions 
Process Draw on expertise of local 
machine and tooling 
manufacturers 
Design better and cheaper 
process solutions than 
parent 
 
F4   Foreign Catalytic converters/
aftermarket + 
licensees 
Design and 
testing 
 
New solutions 
problem-driven 
 
Emission 
regulations 
Parent (OEM 
partner) 
 
In-house efforts 
 
 
Own search 
activity 
Product 3-4% turnover on R&D; 
strategic alliance with 
customer 
Product Increase performance with 
lower maintenance costs; 
apply accumulated expertise 
to new cats for diesels and 
heavy vehicles 
 
Identification of common 
characteristics of diverse 
OEM designs to simplify 
replacement models 
Keep technological edge 
 
 
 
 
 
Retain price 
competitiveness 
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Figure 2. – Stylised firm trajectories 
Aftermarket 
CUST
Local
Low
High
CONTROL29
MARKET 
OMER OEMs 
Global
Table 5. – Principal strategic positioning of case firms 
 
Firm What? How? Why? 
    
D1 Niche Volume targeted 
between global and local 
(“marginal” supplies to 
e.g. Visteon) 
Reconcile limited financial and 
organisational capacity with 
technological and growth 
opportunity 
 
D2 Niche Volume targeted 
between global and local 
(1) Enhance control over product 
and vis-à-vis customers 
(2) Vehicles targeted at local 
market more scope for local R&D 
 
D3 Permit 
diversification 
Negotiate relaxation of 
zero-modification 
requirements with OEMs 
 
Enhance control over product and 
vis-à-vis customers 
 
D4 Niche Team up with licensors Reduce reliance on local market 
 
F1 World 
mandate 
Combine technical 
assistance with preferred 
suppliers in source 
country, advantageous 
access to raw materials, 
and unique toolings 
 
Enhance control over product and 
vis-à-vis customers 
 
F2 (1) World 
mandate 
 
 
(2) Customer 
diversification 
 
(1) Achieve excellence 
within group 
 
 
(2) Group supply + 
aftermarket + 3rd parties 
 
(1) Fend off competitive threat 
from group operations in China 
and Eastern Europe 
 
(2) Insure against cost-based-only 
advantages vulnerable to model 
changes 
 
F3 Niche + 
world 
mandate 
Group supply + local 
OEM contracts for 
export CBUs 
 
Compensate location 
disadvantage through 
manufacturing excellence and risk 
diversification 
 
F4 Blue sky Exploit new JVs for 
global distribution 
channels 
Secure viability of SA location 
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Appendix 1 
 
Notes for a semi-structured interview with select car component manufacturers, March 2003 
 
Premise 
 
The purpose of these exploratory conversations is to probe the conditions for innovation activity in the 
automotive supply sector in South Africa. More specifically, the inquiry focuses on the relative dearth 
of product innovation since the opening of the sector to global competition and the arrival of foreign 
OEMs. Conceptually, we look at three different levels of analysis, namely the 
• individual firm and its (dynamic) capabilities (including intra- and inter-firm relations) 
• structure of global automotive supply chains 
• national innovation system. 
 
 
Section 1: The firm level 
 
1.1 Do you aim at product innovation? (If “no”, why not?) 
 
1.2 If “yes”, what do you target? 
 
1.3 What type of resources do you commit to your innovation activity in terms of … ? 
a) capital investment/equipment: (specific R&D outlays) 
b) skills (operating and managerial know-how): (Is learning a by-product from doing or a 
purposeful search?) 
c) product and input specifications (How do you generate and manage technical change?) 
d) organisational systems (How do you combine activities of R&D labs, design offices, 
production engineering etc.?) 
 
1.4 Do you believe that your involvement in quality control and production organisation has allowed 
(or will allow) you to generate activities in R&D, design, and production engineering (i.e. is 
there a progression from process to product innovation)? 
 
Section 2: The supply chain level 
 
2.1 In general, do you feel that local design and development activity is increasing or decreasing? 
 
2.2 In general, what is the more important impediment to acquiring global supply mandates…? 
a) your technological capability per se 
b) the financial, managerial and organisational resources required to develop global 
operations 
c) control by OEMs and/or parent company and/or JV partner and/or licensor and/or 
technical aid partner 
 
Section 3: The national innovation system 
 
3.1 Do technological opportunities on the domestic market differ from the demands of the global 
market? 
 
3.2 Are technical and graduate engineering skills readily available to you? (If “no”, what are the key 
weaknesses?) 
 
3.3 Do you feel that your scientists and/or engineers possess the problem-solving skills and the 
familiarity with research methodologies and instrumentation (and are they perhaps members in 
international networks of professional peers) to put your skill profile/technological capability at 
par with your global competitors? (If “no”, probe for reasons.) 
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